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Executive summary      
 
The paper investigates the characteristics of social involvement in Europe by 
tracing and identikit of the shares of individuals that are more likely to be involved 
with different kinds of formal organizations and showing how each of these groups 
perceives the political, economical, and relational spheres of social reality. 
The analysis covers 19 European countries and is based on indicators for which 
the data has been principally drawn from the European Social Survey of 2002. The 
results indicate an heterogeneous Europe in which Nordic and Continental countries 
are adequately representing by the existing indicators, which determine the 
representation of reality that we are using. Mediterranean and Eastern countries, on 
the other side, appear follow different participatory schemes. Thus, alternative 
variables, such as informal participation, must be collected and analyzed to inform 
policies that can effectively support the different forms of interactions (both formal 
and informal) between State and Society.  
Moreover, education has a consistently positive effect for all kinds of 
participation in all the countries under analysis. Such result advocates for looking at 
education as one of the possibly most transversal policy actions to undertake and 
suggests the importance of working on the quality of education systems both at basic 
and higher level. 
 
 
 
Introduction  
In the course of history the European Union has established itself as a level of 
policy making that is perceived as being largely economically driven. The Single 
Market, the stability and growth pact, the introduction of the euro, competition policy 
and trade policy are all key European level competences. But ever since Jacques 
Delors there has been an 'uncomfortable feeling' by many about the dominance of 
economic issues. Should the Union show its 'social face too'? Is economics 'all that 
matters'? 
For a while 'showing a social face' or quid pro quo social policies to 'compensate 
for the losses of economic policies ' could be seen as the driving political forces of 
social policies at the European level, exemplified by the original Lisbon agenda of 
2000, where social policies and economic policies where identified as separate pillars, 
arguably in part for those reasons.  
One of the risks of such an approach is that it puts economic and social policies 
as antagonistic entities, often leading to polarized political discussions as if countries 
have to choose between free markets or social societies. And even if that is not the 
case it erroneously displays economic and social policies as disjoint entities that do 
not interact. In reality they do interact intensively either in a mutually reinforcing way 
or in a way that trades off one against the other. 
The link with EU policies and social items also show up in Eurobarometer 
surveys. For instance the Belgians think the European Union should fight 
unemployment (49%), poverty and social exclusion (47%) as a priority. At the top of 
the Danes’ wish list as to how the EU should prioritize its tasks are: protecting the 
environment, peace and security, as well as fighting terrorism and poverty. And even 
in a liberal country such as Ireland the most popular answer to the question 'which 
actions should the European Union prioritize?' is a surprising 'fight poverty/social 
exclusion'.F2F 
In the last years the European Commission has tried to integrate social policies 
into their core business without doing injustice to relative responsibilities by other 
policy levels. To do so effectively, since the revision of the Lisbon strategy in 2005 
into a growth and jobs agenda and particularly after the informal Summit in Hampton 
Court in the end of 2005, a new logic prevailed. 
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The conventional wisdom that greater economic prosperity drives jobs growth 
that in turn drives wellbeing in general can be challenged (Liddle and Lerais, 2007). 
Not only is such logic not perceived as such by many citizens, it is also still based on 
a pillared view of economic and social policies. The logic is that economic activities 
create the size of the pie while social policies deal with the division of it. 
If we look at the characteristics of our current and likely future societies such 
logic falls apart. Europe of today and tomorrow is more diverse than yesterday, 
people face different social risks, the world moves at a higher speed, is more 
knowledge driven and the population is ageing rapidly. The consequence of the 
combination of these characteristics is that future wellbeing does not only depend on 
economic activities. Tomorrows Europe needs inter alia: (i) the highest possible 
education for all; (ii) the highest labour participation possible; (iii) well integrated 
migrants that add value to European societies; (iv) healthy citizens; (v) citizens fully 
participating in civil society. 
These requirements are not needed (just) for social reasons but for economic 
reasons too. They do not relate (solely) to division of the pie but have clear 
implications for creation of a larger pie. More, healthier, better educated and 
participating citizens create higher growth.  
One of the consequences of the different nature of interactions between 
economic and social policies is that there is a shift in responsibilities. There is more 
need for policy coherence across layers, there is an increased role for NGO's and more 
than in the past there is a sharper emphasis on prevention and own responsibility is 
needed. 
In essence, civil societyF3F is both the substratum that will “eat the pie”, and a 
primary stake-holder of the policy making process so that cooking the foresaid recipe 
results from a process of co-ordination and valorization of the different forms of 
interactions (both formal and informal) between State and Society. The existence of at 
least four European social models with different structures and rules (Sapir, 2005) 
prevents the implementation of 1-fits-all solutions; moreover, the rapid social 
evolution that we witness could imply a change in the values and characteristics 
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commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of 
formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered 
charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women's organisations, 
intrinsic to each model. Hence, the European process of coordination could benefit 
from the identification of some transversal characteristics of civil society and some 
common avenues for change, as well as from the identification of specificities to be 
exploited in order to maximize policy impact. 
“What are the determinants of social involvement and how can involvement 
enhance the results of the coordination process between State and stakeholders in an 
increasingly diverse society?” As previously suggested, tomorrows Europe needs 
citizens fully participating in civil society. Hence, the paper investigates the 
characteristics of the shares of individuals that are more likely to be involved with 
different kinds of formal organizations and shows how each of these groups perceives 
the political, economical, and relational spheres of social reality. 
                                                                                                                                            
faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social 
movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups”. 
A renewed role for individual participation. 
TAlternative focuses 
Traditional welfare states are generally unequipped for facing the challenges of a 
social woven dependant on an ageing population whose demographic composition is 
rapidly changing. The situation is also complicated by new and renewed challenges – 
social exclusion, sustainability, unemployment, security… – that pose a further 
burden on the evolving dimension of the ‘European quality of life’. Hence, 
“innovative social policies … tend to delegate power for local implementation to 
collaborative public-private arrangements and even to wholly private actors. We see 
more and more decentralised co-ordination. This applies also to policy experiments at 
the EU level” (Esping-Andersen et al.: 9). Vertical subsidiarity becomes the necessary 
tool for horizontal subsidiarity, as it opens the public service sector to the market, 
civil society and social entrepreneurship.TPF4FPT Trough their ties with public businesses 
and profit organizations, non-profit organizations become a part of the economic 
activity (i.e. health care, education, assistance, culture, environmental protection and 
transport) and take on the independent and legitimate role of interpreting social needs 
and of launching cooperation strategies at territorial level.  
In social policies developed along these lines, the voice of the citizen needs to be 
heard at the outset of the public-value creation process and not merely when protests 
or complaints are made. This means ensuring that, via the right social channels, 
citizens have access to those institutional conditions that will allow them to be a part 
of the intervention programming process and of the ensuing strategy adoption phase.  
As indicated before, citizens’ concerns with public issues are constant, but the 
traditional forms of participation and policy engagement show signs of fatigue. This 
fact suggests that individuals are more and more inclined to use alternative 
architectures – such as cohesive local networks (civil society, private sector) and 
global networks (international organisations and NGOs) – for advocating their needs. 
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As Dobell and Mitchell suggest, “analytic formulation of policy within an agency has 
been replaced to a considerable extent by organic, unpredictable and often highly 
conflictual public multistakeholder processes of formation of policy, not only through 
executive or legislative stages of policy  adoption, but through multi-agency and 
private sector partnerships for implementation and co-management” (Dobell and 
Mitchell, 1997, 27-28).  
 
For optimizing their responsiveness, the institutions, on one side, must learn how 
these structures are built and interact and, on the other side, must understand who the 
individuals that participate in the process are. 
 
TIndividual participation and contribution to social capital 
The scope of our analysis is to identify the characteristics of the shares of 
individuals that are more likely to be involved with different kinds of formal 
organizations and to investigate how each of these groups perceives the political, 
economical, and relational spheres of social reality. 
As Putnam (1993, 2000) and other researchers (Woolcock, 2001; Adler and 
Kwon, 2002; van Oorschot and Arts, 2005, for effects on the European welfare states) 
suggest, not all participation is conducive to positive results in terms of attentiveness 
to social and economic challenges. The classical Putnam’s distinction between 
bridging (or inclusive) and bonding (or exclusive) social capital suggests that: 
“Some forms of social capital are, by choice or necessity, inward looking and tend to 
reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups. Examples of bonding social capital 
include ethnic fraternal organizations, church-based women's reading groups, and 
fashionable country clubs. Other networks are outward looking and encompass people across 
diverse social cleavages. Examples of bridging social capital include the civil rights 
movement, many youth service groups, and ecumenical religious organizations” (Putnam, 
2000, 22).  
Previous work (e.g. Beugelsdijk & Smulders, 2003; Sabatini, 2005; Beyerlein & 
Hipp, 2005) focuses on the distinction between bridging and bonding social capital, 
eventually to categorize the various networks and organizations to which people 
belong. However, as Woolcock (2000, p. 80) suggests “[t]he policy response to 
reading the social capital literature should not be a call for more choirs and soccer 
clubs, as writers satirizing Putnam have tended to infer.” In fact, as suggested earlier, 
we are interested in the characteristics and development of the European social reality 
as a whole. Specifically, we are trying to understand what the determinants of social 
involvement are and whether involvement can enhance the results of the coordination 
process between State and stakeholders in an increasingly diverse society. 
A consistent body of literature (see for example: Dasgupta, 2003; Völker and 
Derk, 2004) suggests the existence of a positive link between bridging and linkage 
capital and economic prosperity in the sense that “bridging social ties (sometimes 
called ‘weak’ ties) are more likely to be drivers of economic growth than bonding 
social ties” (Putnam, 2002). One possible explanation of such parallelisms is given by 
Sapir and highlights the need of the “adaptation to change paradigm” proposed in 
section 2:  
“Instead of fostering the necessary adaptation and flexible responses to increasingly 
rapid changes, modern European welfare states … [] now often protect the status quo. And as 
James Heckman (the Nobel Prize winner) rightly states in his insightful analysis of Europe, 
‘The opportunity cost of security and preservation of the status quo – whether it is the status 
quo technology, the status quo trading partner, or the status quo job – has risen greatly in 
recent times’ (Heckman, 2002)”. 
Indeed, in a comparison with the United States (fig. 1), Europe as a whole lags 
behind in all aspects of investment in R&D, Communications, IT & Software, and 
Higher Education. The result is a substantial slowness in productivity growth (1995-
2004). 
 
Figure 1: Investments in various forms of knowledge and productivity growth (1995-2004): 
comparison between EU and USA 
 
 Recalling the initial argument, the figure could suggest a predominance of 
bonding ties that anchor the EU to maintaining the status-quo, rather than investing 
for changing. However, if we break-up these effects at country level, we can notice 
that the intensity of the investments tends to co-vary with welfare state characteristics, 
especially on a North-South axis. For instance, high welfare spending in the 
Scandinavian countries goes hand in hand with a relatively higher level of wealth 
(GDP), a relatively smaller income inequality. Low welfare spending in the 
Mediterranean countries goes together with a lower level of wealth, a larger income 
inequality (fig. 2). 
 
Figure 2 : GDP per capita, social protection and inequality of income distribution. An 
European overview (2004-2005) 
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Data source : Eurostat (Expenditure in social protection and GDP per capita relate to 2004, 
Inequality of income relates to 2005) 
 
The picture does not change when looking at investments in R&D, Higher 
Education, and ICT (fig.3) whereby Finland and Sweden match closely the US figure 
of 8% of GDP invested in the afore specified chapters with a specific focus on R&D. 
Southern European countries, on the other hand stop half way through at about 4%.  
 
 Figure 3 : Investment in knowledge : An European overview (2005) 
 
 
Referring again to the initial paradigm, these figures make us wonder whether 
there is any parallelism between such diversified investment strategies and the 
prevalent type of social capital in the various European countries.  
As Liddle and Lerais (2007) suggest, however, Europe's social reality is a rather 
fragmented picture. Many people now “see their lives in terms of a personal 
biography they write for themselves. This is not to say that people are no longer 
concerned about ‘social cohesion’: on the contrary surveys suggest that many are, but 
many have no desire to return to the old conformities of family, class or religion.” 
Social cohesion, individualization, participation, acceptance, disinterest; making sense 
of all these apparently diverse indicators requires a ‘dashboard’ that recovers basic 
message behind all these signals. One such measure is the Active Citizenship 
Composite Indicator (ACCI). This aggregated index has been built by the European 
Commission – Centre for Research on Lifelong learning to measure the European 
active and democratic citizenship, defined as: 
Participation in civil society, community and/or political life, characterized by mutual 
respect and non-violence and in accordance with human rights and democracy (Hoskins, 
2006). 
 The ACCI covers 19 European countries and is based on a list of 63 basic 
indicators for which the data has been principally drawn from the European Social 
Survey of 2002. This composite indicator shows a heterogeneous Europe where 
Nordic countries lead and southern European countries perform well in Values and 
Political Life but lag behind in Civil Society and Community Life dimensions 
(Hoskins et a., 2006, see fig. 4) TPF5FPT.  
 
Figure 4 : The Active Citizenship Composite Indicator 
 
 
The overall picture produced by the indicator supports the hypothesis by which 
the intensity of change follows a North-South axis. However, the indicator cannot tell 
us much with respect to the role of the different types of social capital for the progress 
of European societies. In fact, as depicted in figure …, the structure of the indicator 
considers positively all kinds of participation. Still, as suggested earlier, the 
prevalence of different forms of participation may imply a trade-off between 
behaviors aimed at maintaining the status quo or at fostering progress. Hence, it’s 
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necessary to investigate whether such trade of does exist and whether the behavior 
follows a mere North-South axis, or whether more articulated structures are required. 
 
TA possible taxonomy of European social models 
Various authors have are supportive of the idea of a complex Europe built 
around numerous alternative social models.  
Sapir identifies four basic models of welfare on the basis of the trade-offs 
existing between efficiency and equity, whereby a model is considered efficient if it 
provides sufficient incentive to work and, therefore, if it generates relatively high 
employment rates. It will be deemed equitable if it keeps the risk of poverty relatively 
low (Sapir, 2005, fig. 5).  
This idea is extremely appealing because it refers directly to a trade off between 
the need of securing opportunities to everybody – hence maintaining the status quo 
and promoting progress – and the sustainability of the exercise – hence the factual 
possibility of supporting the growing price of the status quo. 
 
Figure 5: The four European Models, a typology 
 
 
The following analysis will basically adopt Sapir’s taxonomy and will develop 
an in-depth analysis of the European styles of participation to investigate whether 
alternative participatory strategies entail different approaches to society. 
 
 
 
Nordics: Denmark, Finland, Sweden, plus the 
Netherlands. 
Anglo-Saxons: Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
Continentals: Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany and Luxembourg. 
Mediterraneans: Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain. 
 
 
 
Source: Sapir, 2005 
 
 
Participation and European Social Models 
T he data 
Favoring the fine-tuning of the process of institutional responsiveness requires 
identifying the objective characteristics and the perceptions of the actively engaged 
individuals. 
To achieve this aim, we investigated the European Social Survey 
(http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/), which ran a specific module on citizenship 
in 2002. This data is more up-to-date than that which is available from alternative 
sources, such as the World Values Survey and IEA’s CIVED, which is currently only 
available from 1999.  
The European Social Survey (the ESS) is an academically-driven social survey 
designed to chart and explain the interaction between Europe's changing institutions 
and the attitudes, the beliefs, and the behavioral patterns of its diverse populations. 
The survey is administered every two years (the forth wave is scheduled for 2008) and 
consists in a core questionnaire and two rotating modules. In the first wave of 2002 
one of these modules was on citizenship; such data was not available in the 2004 issue 
and the 2006 data hasn’t been disclosed yet. 
The European Social Survey (ESS) aims to be representative of all residents 
among the population aged 15 years and above in each participating country. The size 
and the quality of the sample make the European country coverage in the ESS data 
reasonably good, with 18 EU member states providing data of sufficient quality. 
Among the 18 investigated member states, Austria, France, Hungary, and Ireland 
have been excluded from the analysis because some variables were completely 
missing in the dataset as some questions were not asked in the national versions of the 
questionnaire. Although data on Poland has revealed anomalous patterns (see section 
4.6) we have decided to keep the country in the dataset for the analysis. 
The dataset under investigation is therefore composed by 26491 observations. 
The sample is representative at the national level for the 14 European countries 
considered, which are: Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, United 
Kingdom, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, Nederland, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and 
Sweden. The number of observations was subsequently reduced to 24023 to exclude 
people below 18 or above 80 years of age. 
 
 T he Variables 
In the European Social Survey 2002, individuals were asked about their ways of 
participating to several types of organizations (sport, cultural, trade union, business, 
human rights, environment/peace, religious, politics, social, teacher/parents 
organizations), and they could choose among four different behaviors (membership, 
donating money, participation and voluntary work) recorded as dichotomous variables 
(values 0/1). For each type of organization, the strength of individual participation 
amounts to the sum of the scores that the individual has obtained with respect to the 
foresaid possible behaviors. 
Specifically, we created a new variable equal to the sum of the four binary 
variables describing the possible action of engagements in that organization. 
 
∑== 4 1 ,i ihh XY  
 
where h=1..10,  is the type of organization and i=1..4, are the forth different 
ways of engagement. Each variable can assume a value from 0 (no action taken)  to 4 
(the person is engaged in all possible ways). 
On the basis of the definitions of bridging and bonding social capital, we divided 
individual participation into two categories: 
1. Social engagement, individuals participating to organizations that are 
outward looking and aim at improving the society at large (Cultural, Human 
Rights, Social, Religious, Environmental/Peace organization). 
2. Private engagement, encompasses the organizations that work closer to the 
private interest of the respondent (Sport, Trade Union, Business, 
Teacher/Parents, Political Party). 
A factor analysis using polychoric correlations for ordered-category data was 
carried out to validate the consistency of this theoretical grouping. The results of the 
analysis confirm the hypothesis and explain approximately the 40% of the variance. 
The two groups were used as the basis for constructing two variables – SOCIAL 
ENGAGEMENT and PRIVATE ENGAGEMENT – given respectively by the 
aggregation of the variables reporting higher factor loadings in factor 1 (social 
engagement) and in factor 2 (private engagement), respectively. On the basis of the 10 
categories of organizations previously identified (sport, cultural, trade union, 
business, human rights, environment/peace, religious, politics, social, teacher/parents 
organizations), the variables social engagement and private engagement ended up 
having the following structure:   
 
SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT = YBCulturalB+ YBSocial B + YBEnv/PeaceB YBHumanRightsB + YBReligiousB  
PRIVATE ENGAGEMENT= YBSportB + YBTradeUnion B + YB usinessB + YBTeacher/Parents B + YBPoliticalB 
 
Subsequently, we created the variable ENGAGEMENT that will constitute the 
basis of our analysis. ENGAGEMENT is a multinomial variable that takes values 
from 0 to 3 defined as follows: 
 
ENGAGEMENT = 0 - individuals not participating in any organization; 
ENGAGEMENT = 1 - individuals participating just in  social organizations;  
ENGAGEMENT = 2 - individuals participating just in  private organizations;  
ENGAGEMENT = 3 - individuals engaged in both social and private organizations. 
 
To characterize the factors that can determine the decision of an individual to 
participate in formal organizations, the variable ENGAGEMENT was considered as 
the dependent variable, and a set of objective variables reported in the European 
Social Survey was included as explanatory variables. The complete list of the 
explanatory variables considered is reported in table 3. 
 
Table 1 : List of explanatory variables. 
Type Description 
Family Income 
Family income categorized in 12 leves following the ESS scale: Less than 1.800; 
1.800-3.600; 3.600 - 6.000; 6.000 - 12.000; 12.000 - 18.000; 18.000 - 24.000; 
24.000 - 30.000; 30.000 - 36.000 - 36.000 - 60.000; 60.000 - 90.000; 90.000 - 
120.000; more than 120.000.   The last category "120.000 or more" has been 
choosen as reference. 
Age Age of the respondent divided in class: 18 - 24; 24 -35; 35 - 44; 44 - 55; 55 - 65; 65 or more. The last category "65 or more" has been choosen as reference. 
Individual Human 
Capital expressed as years of education. 
Sex 0 = Male; 1 = Female 
Citizenship 0 = No; 1 = Citizen of the country where interviewed 
Number of persons Size of the Family 
Declared Religious 0 = No; 1 = Yes 
Place where the 
respondent lives 
Place where the respondent lives categorized in classes following the ESS scale: 0 
= A big city; 1 = The suburbs of a big city; 2 = A town or a small city; 3 = A country 
village; 4 = A  farm or a home in the countryside. The category " 0 = A big city" has 
been chooses as reference. 
Time spent in 
watching TV 
Time spent during the day in watching TV following the ESS scale: 0 =  No time at 
all; 1 = Less than 1/2 hour; 2 = 0.5 -1 hour; 1 - 1.5 hour; 1.5 - 2 hours;  2 -2.5 
hours; 2.5 - 3 hours;more than 3 hours. 
Time spent in 
listening to the 
Radio 
Time spent during the day in listening to the radio, following the ESS scale: 0 =  No 
time at all; 1 = Less than 1/2 hour; 2 = 0.5 -1 hour; 1 - 1.5 hour; 1.5 - 2 hours;  2 -
2.5 hours; 2.5 - 3 hours;more than 3 hours. 
Time spent in 
reading newspapers 
Time spent during the day in reading newspapers, following the ESS scale: 0 =  No 
time at all; 1 = Less than 1/2 hour; 2 = 0.5 -1 hour; 1 - 1.5 hour; 1.5 - 2 hours;  2 -
2.5 hours; 2.5 - 3 hours;more than 3 hours. 
Time spent in 
surfing the Internet 
Time spent during the day in surfing the internet following the ESS scale: 0 =  No 
time at all; 1 = Less than 1/2 hour; 2 = 0.5 -1 hour; 1 - 1.5 hour; 1.5 - 2 hours;  2 -
2.5 hours; 2.5 - 3 hours;more than 3 hours. 
Main Activity 
Main Activity performed by the respondent during the seven days before the 
interview, coded following the ESS scale: 1 = paid work; 2 = In Education; 3 = 
unemployed and actively looking for a job; 4 = unemployed but not actively looking 
for a job; 5 = permanent sick or disable; 6= retired;  7 = in community or military 
service; 8 = doing houseworks; 9 = other. The category " 1 = in paid work" has 
been choosen has reference. 
Country Dummies A set of dummy variables representing the country effect was included in the model 
 
 
T he Model 
The variable object of the analysis are qualitative, hence the application of 
classical regression models (OLS) is not allowed due to the violation of the basic 
assumptions underneath the model. Modeling qualitative variables with two or more 
categories requires the use of models based on different assumptions that can produce 
reliable estimates and allow for the correct application of standard statistical 
techniques. If the adoption of Logistic Regression could solve the problem of 
modeling dichotomous variables, in the case of variables that can assume more than 
two categories the use of the Ordinal Logit or the Multinomial Logistic regression 
model can face the challenge of providing correct and reliable estimation of the 
parameters. 
The model we decided to adopt to analyze the variable ENGAGEMENT is the 
Multinomial Logit (mLogit). The mLogit is a straightforward extension of the 
classical Logistic model and it is a strategy often-used in the literature when 
categories are unordered (as the case of the variable ENGAGEMENT). In the mLogit 
model a category (Non Participant, in our case) is designated as reference category. 
The probability of membership in other categories (Social, Private and Full 
Engagement) is compared to the probability of membership in the reference category. 
In general for a dependent variable with M categories, the mLogit requires the 
calculation of M-1 equations, one for each category relative to the reference category 
to describe the relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory 
variables. In our case, three different equations have been computed. 
Although possible violations of the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives 
(IIA) assumptions need to be further investigated, similar results have been obtained 
by repeating the analysis and applying several logistic regressions that perform 
pairwise comparisons between the reference category and the other categories. 
 
T he clustering 
With respect to Sapir’s model, we suggest a similar partition, but we group 
Anglo Saxon and Continental countries because Great Britain was left alone, and we 
include an extra group – Eastern – composed by Poland and Slovenia, which were not 
considered in Sapir’s original taxonomy (tab. 4). 
 
Table 2 : Clusters of Countries 
Cluster Countries 
1 Denmark, Sweden, Finland, The Netherlands 
2 Belgium, Germany, Luxemburg, Great Britain 
3 Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain 
4 Poland, Slovenia 
 
 
 T he results – overall  
An initial analysis of the participatory patterns at country level (fig. 6) suggests 
that individuals in all Nordic countries are preponderantly engaged in both private and 
social organizations, while more than 50% of the individuals in Mediterranean 
countries – with the exception of Greece – are not engaged. Greece is an interesting 
outlier because it shows a strikingly high 45% of people that are involved in private 
organizations, a result partly due to the peculiar status of Greek business 
organizations.TPF6FPT In Continental and Anglo-Saxon countries the rates of participation 
are generally above 50%; Slovenia, Germany, and Belgium show high percentages of 
people involved solely with social activities. 
 
Figure 6 :Engagement : how is it distributed among European countries? 
 
 
Various authors have criticized the use of micro-data to account for the behavior 
of social structures that exist only at aggregate level such as social capital.TPF7FPT Although 
such critiques are legitimate, the variables derived from the ESS dataset provide 
                                                 
TP
6
PT See for example: Aranitou, V., (2003), “The strengthening of the employers’ organisations 
representation 
and social dialogue”, paper presented at the S. Karagiorgas Conference on Social Change 
in Contemporary Greece (1980-2001), Athens. 
HTUhttp://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/pdf/symposiumPapersonline/Aranitou.pdf UTH  
TP
7
PT For example, Putnam’s analyses have been criticized because his aggregation of individual-level data 
up to collectivities does not capture the social structural nature of social capital(see Skocpol, 1996, or 
Sampson, 2001). 
valuable information in understanding the character and nature of the social 
connections in a place and the identification and strengthening of the social channels 
through which citizens have access to those institutional conditions that will allow 
them to be a part of the intervention programming process and of the ensuing strategy 
adoption phase. 
Specifically, if the dimensional identification is correct, the level and type of 
participation should reveal a driver of Europe’s social reality whereby social and full 
engagement (which correspond to bridging and linking social capital) should be 
correlated with positive social and economic dynamics. The preponderance of private 
engagement could, on the other hand, be correlated with a more stagnant situation 
because “[b]onding social capital is, as Xavier de Souza Briggs puts it, good for 
‘getting by’ … [while] bridging social capital is crucial for ‘getting ahead’” (Putnam, 
2000, 22). TP PT 
If we sketch the situation at country level with respect to the trade off between 
social engagement and private engagement, we are presented with an interesting 
situation whereby we register a clear polarization between Nordic countries (most 
fully engaged) and Mediterranean countries (most non participants), while the other 
countries present trade-offs in the patterns of participation. 
When considering the variable ENGAGEMENT as the dependent variable and 
the variables listed above as explanatory variables, the analysis of the results the 
mLogit shows an interesting picture, highlighting different profiles of the participants.  
The result of the analysis and the complete list of the coefficients are shown in table 5 
 
 
Table 3 : Coefficients of the model for the whole Europe 
    
Depedent Variable: 
ENGAGEMENT 
Comparison 
between Non 
Engaged and 
Socially Engaged 
  
Comparison between 
Non Engaged and 
Privatelly Engaged 
  
Comparison between 
Non Engaged and 
Fully Engaged 
Explanatory Variables Coef. P>t  Coef. P>t  Coef. P>t 
Income: Less than 1800Euros 0.703 0.511  -2.670 0.001  -2.527 0.004 
Income: Less than 3600Euros 0.786 0.444  -1.939 0.001  -2.882 0.000 
Income: Less than 6000Euros 0.618 0.547  -0.351 0.529  -0.496 0.350 
Income: Less than 12000Euros 1.141 0.256  -1.529 0.007  -1.754 0.001 
Income: Less than 18000Euros 1.878 0.061  -1.399 0.012  -1.587 0.002 
Income: Less than 24000Euros 1.783 0.076  -0.723 0.190  -1.005 0.052 
Income: Less than 30000Euros 0.884 0.384  -1.021 0.069  -1.045 0.043 
Income: Less than 36000Euros 1.240 0.224  -1.140 0.440  -0.800 0.124 
Income: Less than 60000Euros 1.274 0.208  -0.601 0.283  -0.434 0.398 
Income: Less than 90000Euros 1.470 0.156  -0.217 0.714  -0.389 0.478 
Income: Less than 120000Euros 0.690 0.602  -0.936 0.157  -0.694 0.280 
Age (18-24) -1.997 0.000  -0.333 0.313  0.712 0.010 
Age (24-35) -1.940 0.000  -0.181 0.539  0.875 0.000 
Age (35-44) -1.726 0.000  1.001 0.000  1.228 0.000 
Age (44-55) -1.391 0.000  0.340 0.223  1.231 0.000 
Age (55-65) -0.960 0.000  0.648 0.011  1.600 0.000 
Sex -0.389 0.000  -0.815 0.000  -0.741 0.000 
Watching TV -0.113 0.000  0.035 0.153  -0.253 0.000 
Listening to the Radio 0.060 0.001  0.048 0.006  0.077 0.000 
Reading Newspaper -0.268 0.000  0.174 0.000  0.177 0.000 
Surfing the Web -0.006 0.779  0.042 0.000  0.042 0.000 
Individual Human Capital 0.196 0.000  0.098 0.000  0.178 0.000 
Number of persons  0.060 0.145  0.057 0.132  -0.181 0.000 
Residence: suburbs of a big city 0.506 0.007  -0.495 0.002  0.447 0.009 
Residence: small town 0.630 0.000  -0.625 0.000  0.492 0.000 
Residence: country village 0.005 0.979  -0.862 0.000  0.397 0.006 
Residence: home in the 
countryside 0.118 0.735  -0.634 0.041  0.406 0.116 
Citizenship 0.672 0.003  0.610 0.004  0.669 0.000 
Declared Religious 0.946 0.000  0.348 0.004  1.027 0.000 
Main Activity: In education 0.548 0.057  -0.059 0.834  0.227 0.382 
Main Activity: Unemployed, looking 
for job 0.042 0.877  -1.159 0.000  -0.981 0.000 
Main Activity: Unemployed, not 
looking for job -0.519 0.238  -1.086 0.003  -0.415 0.275 
Main Activity: permanently sick -0.040 0.891  -2.015 0.000  -0.582 0.063 
Main Activity:retired 0.098 0.592  -1.249 0.000  0.706 0.000 
Main Activity:community or military 
service 1.437 0.155  0.389 0.745  -1.745 0.070 
Main Activity:houseworker 0.203 0.217  -0.995 0.000  -0.308 0.054 
Main Activity:other -0.365 0.403  -1.081 0.083  0.091 0.823 
Constant -3.606 0.115   -6.198 0.000   -7.110 0.000 
 
 
As suggested earlier, we contend that the social engagement groups are bridging 
and bring citizens into contact with people from a cross-section of society, while the private 
engagement organizations are bonding and tend to aggregate people who have mainly the 
same background. Consistently, the depicted profiles indicate that the income level and the 
main activity of the previous week are not relevant explanatory variables for social 
participation, while it’s highly so for private participation. More specifically, lower 
income and non-active participation to the job market are associated with a substantial 
reduction of the probability of being privately engaged. The age and the place of 
residence have opposite effects whereby older people living in suburbs are more 
likely to participate in social, and working-age individuals living in small cities are 
more likely to participate in private groups. In both cases, males are more likely to 
participate than women, but this distinction is much more evident with respect to 
private participation and it is likely to indicate a bias due to a non-yet-closed gender 
gap. Level of individual human capital (proxied by the years of education), access to 
the media – and in particular listening to the radio – and being natives of the specific 
country of reference increases chances of participation in both types of organizations. 
The same is true for religious affiliation, although this characteristic has a much 
stronger effect on social participation. 
As expected, these profiles show consistent differences between the two 
populations, but present also some relevant similarities. Direct analysis of the profile 
of the fully engaged individuals allows to further elaborate on this issue. 
As reported in the table, individuals that are fully engaged (participate both in 
social and private organizations) have a peculiar profile that seems to be a 
composition of the previous two identikits. First, income plays a big role as the 
probability of being fully engaged decreases for the individuals with a yearly family 
income below 30.000 euros.  
In line with the previous comparison, individuals in the “productive age” are 
more likely to be part of the fully engaged group, as well as men have a higher 
probability than women. Moreover, Individual Human Capital plays a significant 
positive role so that individuals with a higher lever of ICH have a higher probability 
to be members of the Fully Engaged group.  Citizenship and religiosity yield the same 
effect detected in the previous two groups. 
The place where people are living gives an interesting picture; individuals that 
live outside big cities but not completely isolated in the countryside have a higher 
probability to be part of the fully engaged group.  Conversely, the effect of the media 
is controversial; if people who spend more time watching TV have a lower probability 
to be part of the group, increasing the time spent listening to the Radio, reading 
Newspapers and surfing the Web increases the probability to being fully engaged. 
 
T he results inside the clusters 
In order to deepen the investigation, we repeated the analysis for the four 
clusters identified in section 4.3. The comparison of the results shows a peculiar and 
picture of the Europe.  
The analysis of cluster 1 (Nordic countries) gives a clear picture of the dynamics 
related to participation and table 6 shows the results in detail. The comparison of the 
three models resembles the differences identified in the overall results, but not quite. 
First of all, it is worth noticing that income variables are not significant in any of the 
three models, showing that – in the Nordic cluster – income does not have any effect 
on the probability of participate. Subsequently and unlike in the overall picture, 
females do not have a significantly lower probability of being socially of fully 
engaged, while people outside the job market are less likely to be fully engaged.  
 
Table 4 : Coefficients of the model for the Nordic countries 
    Depedent Variable: 
ENGAGEMENT                  - 
Cluster 1: Denmark, Finland, 
Sweden, Netherlands 
Comparison 
between Non 
Engaged and 
Socially Engaged 
  
Comparison between 
Non Engaged and 
Privately Engaged 
  
Comparison between 
Non Engaged and 
Fully Engaged 
Explanatory Variables Coef. P>t  Coef. P>t  Coef. P>t 
Income: Less than 1800Euros -0.065 0.967   -1.489 0.349   -0.609 0.677 
Income: Less than 3600Euros 0.522 0.669   0.485 0.675   0.151 0.885 
Income: Less than 6000Euros -0.312 0.757   -0.366 0.719   -1.482 0.089 
Income: Less than 12000Euros 0.547 0.562   -0.346 0.714   -0.589 0.454 
Income: Less than 18000Euros 0.725 0.440   0.184 0.845   -0.037 0.963 
Income: Less than 24000Euros 0.735 0.431   0.434 0.641   -0.130 0.867 
Income: Less than 30000Euros 0.503 0.594   0.478 0.609   0.388 0.618 
Income: Less than 36000Euros 0.523 0.582   0.324 0.733   0.575 0.464 
Income: Less than 60000Euros 0.741 0.439   1.287 0.171   1.434 0.068 
Income: Less than 90000Euros 0.889 0.360   0.188 0.846   0.198 0.805 
Income: Less than 120000Euros 0.019 0.988   1.205 0.283   0.891 0.355 
Age (18-24) -1.022 0.016   0.130 0.764   -0.004 0.992 
Age (24-35) -1.136 0.002   0.203 0.613   1.251 0.000 
Age (35-44) -1.134 0.003   0.807 0.037   0.866 0.007 
Age (44-55) -0.544 0.106   0.511 0.156   0.542 0.066 
Age (55-65) -0.779 0.005   0.696 0.024   0.806 0.000 
Sex 0.002 0.990   -0.489 0.001   -0.113 0.403 
Watching TV -0.103 0.023   -0.036 0.378   -0.194 0.000 
Listening to the Radio 0.018 0.565   0.046 0.085   0.080 0.001 
Reading Newspaper 0.045 0.576   0.210 0.010   0.346 0.000 
Surfing the Web 0.008 0.861   0.008 0.858   0.040 0.358 
Individual Human Capital 0.099 0.000   0.030 0.279   0.123 0.000 
Number of persons  -0.054 0.567   -0.162 0.019   -0.257 0.000 
Residence: suburbs of a big city 0.405 0.150   -0.022 0.928   0.853 0.000 
Residence: small town 0.492 0.037   0.212 0.314   0.556 0.006 
Residence: country village 0.520 0.038   0.211 0.362   0.954 0.000 
Residence: home in the 
countryside 0.026 0.943   -0.095 0.783   1.308 0.000 
Citizenship 0.462 0.079   0.883 0.000   1.171 0.000 
Declared Religious 0.842 0.000   -0.159 0.305   0.982 0.000 
Main Activity: In education 0.592 0.131   0.024 0.943   0.298 0.315 
Main Activity: Unemployed, looking 
for job -0.058 0.919   -0.617 0.114   -1.065 0.011 
Main Activity: Unemployed, not 
looking for job -0.404 0.492   -0.933 0.037   -1.465 0.000 
Main Activity: permanently sick -0.274 0.513   -1.315 0.000   -0.843 0.009 
Main Activity:retired -0.039 0.899   -1.593 0.000   -0.431 0.081 
Main Activity:community or military 
service … …   … …   … …. 
Main Activity:houseworker -0.192 0.493   -1.237 0.000   -0.887 0.000 
Main Activity:other 0.107 0.823   -1.805 0.001   -0.785 0.044 
Constant -2.071 0.069   -1.106 0.316   -2.260 0.014 
 
The analysis of the results of cluster 2 (Belgium, Germany, Great Britain and 
Luxemburg) are shown in table 7 and gives a slightly different picture. 
In contrast with the results obtained with the Nordic countries, in this cluster the 
income play a major role in the probability to be privately and fully engaged where 
people with an income lower than 60.000 € have a decreasing probability of 
participate. Nevertheless the income turns out to be non significant for the probability 
to be part of the socially engaged group. 
Older people are still more likely to be part of the socially engaged group, but 
the effect is much clearer in this cluster than the previous analysis. The same 
consideration holds for men, who have a much higher probability of being part of any 
group.  
On other hand, the effect of the place of domicile maintains its direction but is 
weaker than in the Nordic countries, and people outside the job market seem to have 
an higher probability to be part of the socially engaged groups whereas they are less 
likely to be member of the privately or fully engaged groups. 
 
Table 5 : Coefficients of the model for the Continental countries 
    Depedent Variable: 
ENGAGEMENT                  - 
Cluster 2: Belgium, Germany, 
Great Britain, Luxemburg 
Comparison 
between Non 
Engaged and 
Socially Engaged   
Comparison between 
Non Engaged and 
Privately Engaged 
  
Comparison between 
Non Engaged and 
Fully Engaged 
Explanatory Variables Coef. P>t  Coef. P>t  Coef. P>t 
Income: Less than 1800Euros -0.379 0.792   -2.169 0.045   -4.971 0.000 
Income: Less than 3600Euros 0.620 0.639   -2.245 0.017   -3.240 0.000 
Income: Less than 6000Euros 0.010 0.994   -2.936 0.004   -1.833 0.012 
Income: Less than 12000Euros 0.290 0.812   -2.815 0.000   -2.356 0.000 
Income: Less than 18000Euros 1.441 0.233   -2.277 0.002   -2.208 0.001 
Income: Less than 24000Euros 0.982 0.421   -1.764 0.012   -1.543 0.014 
Income: Less than 30000Euros 0.142 0.908   -1.785 0.011   -1.625 0.010 
Income: Less than 36000Euros 0.606 0.623   -1.645 0.020   -1.591 0.012 
Income: Less than 60000Euros 0.694 0.570   -1.505 0.032   -1.310 0.036 
Income: Less than 90000Euros 0.602 0.634   -0.926 0.204   -1.232 0.063 
Income: Less than 120000Euros -1.425 0.294   -0.002 0.914   -1.693 0.057 
Age (18-24) -2.389 0.000   0.050 0.919   0.156 0.677 
Age (24-35) -2.457 0.000   0.238 0.568   -0.009 0.976 
Age (35-44) -2.065 0.000   0.303 0.464   0.101 0.746 
Age (44-55) -1.451 0.000   0.806 0.046   0.688 0.021 
Age (55-65) -1.081 0.000   0.900 0.014   0.484 0.052 
Sex -0.549 0.000   -0.381 0.020   -0.631 0.000 
Watching TV -0.118 0.004   -0.074 0.077   -0.176 0.000 
Listening to the Radio 0.071 0.007   0.056 0.045   0.001 0.979 
Reading Newspaper -0.351 0.000   0.053 0.380   0.215 0.000 
Surfing the Web -0.003 0.039   -0.005 0.004   -0.002 0.083 
Individual Human Capital 0.229 0.000   0.119 0.000   0.210 0.000 
Number of persons  0.089 0.217   0.082 0.248   -0.018 0.753 
Residence: suburbs of a big city 0.685 0.020   0.201 0.472   0.429 0.078 
Residence: small town 0.607 0.017   -0.122 0.607   0.081 0.689 
Residence: country village 0.206 0.484   0.110 0.677   0.461 0.035 
Residence: home in the 
countryside 0.649 0.244   0.366 0.476   0.594 0.183 
Citizenship 0.609 0.044   0.281 0.311   0.579 0.012 
Declared Religious 0.993 0.000   0.364 0.029   1.059 0.000 
Main Activity: In education 1.285 0.010   0.172 0.749   0.491 0.225 
Main Activity: Unemployed, looking 
for job -0.018 0.963   0.017 0.959   -0.873 0.021 
Main Activity: Unemployed, not 
looking for job 0.273 0.665   -0.120 0.840   0.210 0.610 
Main Activity: permanently sick -0.055 0.887   -1.819 0.000   -0.570 0.140 
Main Activity:retired 0.075 0.789   -0.481 0.152   -0.060 0.819 
Main Activity:community or military 
service 0.817 0.415   1.715 0.212   -1.413 0.087 
Main Activity:houseworker 0.573 0.019   -0.215 0.421   -0.205 0.361 
Main Activity:other -0.499 0.522   -0.359 0.764   0.815 0.193 
Constant -3.547 0.008   -1.117 0.250   -1.765 0.032 
 
The story changes altogether when looking at the Eastern and the Mediterranean 
clusters. In fact, the analysis of the Mediterranean countries (Italy, Greece, Portugal 
and Spain, tab. 8) and of the Eastern countries (Poland and Slovenia, tab. 9) triggers 
concerns on the validity of the proposed model for these clusters.  
First of all, the limited number of significant coefficients coming out from the 
model suggests that, in these clusters, participation is driven by variables not 
considered in the model and not collected through the survey.  
Moreover, the variables used for the analysis are self reported and doubts persist 
on the reliability of the variable income. For example, almost nobody declared a 
yearly family income above €90.000,00 in any of the two clusters. 
With respect to the Eastern cluster, as mentioned before, doubts persist on the 
reliability of the Polish data. In fact, the Polish dataset shows anomalous patterns of 
response by which 80% of the individuals answer consistently in the same manner. 
Although we haven’t reported the detailed table, we have also re-run the model on the 
Slovenian sample alone, and the results are quite similar to those of the Continental 
countries. 
Provided these caveats, the analysis confirms, for both the clusters, some 
common trends appeared in the previous groups of countries. The role of age in the 
socially engaged group is similar to what recorded for Nordic and continental 
countries, as well as the role of the individual human capital or the people outside the 
job market that looks less likely to be part of the privately engaged group. Moreover, 
women still appear to be less likely to be engaged in all the groups.  
The adoption of a different model exploring new dimensions and variables 
appear necessary for modeling the participation in these parts of Europe. 
 
Table 6 : Coefficients of the model for the Mediterranean countries 
  Depedent Variable: 
ENGAGEMENT                  - 
Cluster 3: Greece, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal 
Comparison 
between Non 
Engaged and 
Socially Engaged   
Comparison between 
Non Engaged and 
Privately Engaged 
  
Comparison between 
Non Engaged and 
Fully Engaged 
Explanatory Variables Coef. P>t  Coef. P>t  Coef. P>t 
Income: Less than 1800Euros -1.435 0.226   -1.788 0.064   1.020 0.223 
Income: Less than 3600Euros -3.047 0.001   -1.994 0.010   -1.919 0.025 
Income: Less than 6000Euros -1.341 0.093   -1.017 0.132   0.001 0.999 
Income: Less than 12000Euros -1.037 0.183   -0.405 0.416   -0.725 0.241 
Income: Less than 18000Euros -1.047 0.168   -0.652 0.192   -0.180 0.756 
Income: Less than 24000Euros -0.026 0.972   0.073 0.879   -0.097 0.870 
Income: Less than 30000Euros -0.993 0.217   -0.428 0.440   -0.521 0.401 
Income: Less than 36000Euros -0.504 0.530   -1.254 0.036   0.244 0.698 
Income: Less than 60000Euros -1.398 0.112   0.251 0.655   0.295 0.641 
Income: Less than 90000Euros P*P … ….   … ….   … …. 
Income: Less than 120000Euros P*P … ….   … ….   … …. 
Age (18-24) -1.025 0.042   -0.858 0.294   -0.961 0.163 
Age (24-35) -0.921 0.023   -0.303 0.690   -0.829 0.177 
Age (35-44) -1.294 0.003   0.692 0.347   -0.282 0.611 
Age (44-55) -0.778 0.050   -0.072 0.922   -0.406 0.463 
Age (55-65) -0.647 0.050   0.395 0.559   0.064 0.894 
Sex 0.347 0.142   -0.909 0.000   -0.614 0.008 
Watching TV -0.070 0.161   0.020 0.717   -0.095 0.119 
Listening to the Radio -0.039 0.329   0.028 0.518   0.083 0.046 
Reading Newspaper 0.036 0.723   0.060 0.486   0.196 0.030 
Surfing the Web -0.051 0.309   0.019 0.118   0.026 0.005 
Individual Human Capital 0.120 0.000   0.102 0.000   0.127 0.000 
Number of persons  -0.040 0.626   0.067 0.427   0.084 0.373 
Residence: suburbs of a big city 1.039 0.006   0.476 0.231   0.139 0.758 
Residence: small town 0.994 0.001   0.545 0.068   0.769 0.022 
Residence: country village 0.564 0.067   0.273 0.426   0.483 0.184 
Residence: home in the 
countryside 0.482 0.450   0.526 0.372   -0.864 0.302 
Citizenship 0.968 0.078   0.618 0.228   0.632 0.222 
Declared Religious 0.094 0.759   0.162 0.575   0.455 0.107 
Main Activity: In education 0.014 0.981   0.717 0.206   0.470 0.375 
Main Activity: Unemployed, looking 
for job 0.469 0.328   -0.696 0.251   -0.887 0.126 
Main Activity: Unemployed, not 
looking for job -0.340 0.445   -0.199 0.765   0.334 0.432 
Main Activity: permanently sick 0.685 0.274   -3.734 0.001   0.009 0.993 
Main Activity:retired -0.169 0.657   -1.259 0.044   -0.350 0.468 
Main Activity:community or military 
serviceP*P … …   … …   -1.413 0.087 
Main Activity:houseworker 0.237 0.234   -2.560 0.000   -1.667 0.000 
Main Activity:other P*P … …   0.572 0.017   0.429 0.116 
Constant -3.547 0.008   -3.424 0.001   -3.915 0.000 
* variable excluded for scarcity of data 
 
Table 7 : Coefficients of the model for the Eastern countries 
    Depedent Variable: 
ENGAGEMENT                  - 
Cluster 3: Poland, Slovenia 
Comparison 
between Non 
Engaged and 
Socially Engaged   
Comparison between 
Non Engaged and 
Privately Engaged 
  
Comparison between 
Non Engaged and 
Fully Engaged 
Explanatory Variables Coef. P>t  Coef. P>t  Coef. P>t 
Income: Less than 1800Euros P*P … …   … …   … … 
Income: Less than 3600Euros -0.357 0.387   0.707 0.250   0.839 0.304 
Income: Less than 6000Euros -0.509 0.209   0.780 0.102   2.463 0.001 
Income: Less than 12000Euros -0.094 0.824   0.355 0.562   2.078 0.010 
Income: Less than 18000Euros 0.256 0.626   0.011 0.988   2.302 0.010 
Income: Less than 24000Euros -0.157 0.811   0.275 0.753   1.929 0.041 
Income: Less than 30000Euros 0.605 0.369   1.361 0.123   3.478 0.002 
Income: Less than 36000Euros -0.534 0.647   0.129 0.922   0.582 0.613 
Income: Less than 60000Euros P*P … ….   … ….   … …. 
Income: Less than 90000Euros P*P … ….   … ….   … …. 
Income: Less than 120000Euros P*P … ….   … ….   … …. 
Age (18-24) -1.450 0.012   0.015 0.983   0.633 0.430 
Age (24-35) -0.937 0.054   -0.184 0.763   0.342 0.649 
Age (35-44) -0.943 0.048   1.952 0.000   1.197 0.073 
Age (44-55) -0.997 0.024   0.512 0.314   1.483 0.016 
Age (55-65) -0.252 0.484   0.346 0.501   2.609 0.000 
Sex -0.179 0.422   -0.696 0.001   -1.055 0.000 
Watching TV -0.074 0.106   0.069 0.186   -0.471 0.000 
Listening to the Radio 0.033 0.385   0.019 0.636   0.197 0.000 
Reading Newspaper 0.084 0.375   0.284 0.001   0.215 0.113 
Surfing the Web 0.059 0.274   0.280 0.000   0.148 0.048 
Individual Human Capital 0.083 0.032   -0.036 0.467   0.144 0.001 
Number of persons  0.081 0.250   0.077 0.256   -0.440 0.000 
Residence: suburbs of a big city -0.837 0.114   -0.724 0.127   0.976 0.116 
Residence: small town -0.022 0.932   -1.072 0.000   1.414 0.001 
Residence: country village -0.622 0.042   -1.683 0.000   0.403 0.403 
Residence: home in the 
countryside -0.280 0.665   -0.863 0.212   2.442 0.000 
Citizenship 2.103 0.002   -0.683 0.314   1.094 0.040 
Declared Religious 0.360 0.261   0.278 0.433   0.716 0.083 
Main Activity: In education 0.499 0.354   -0.671 0.249   0.662 0.324 
Main Activity: Unemployed, looking 
for job -0.393 0.481   -0.177 0.435   0.613 0.320 
Main Activity: Unemployed, not 
looking for job -0.145 0.556   -0.987 0.643   0.099 0.543 
Main Activity: permanently sick -0.553 0.516   -4.279 0.000   -2.228 0.052 
Main Activity:retired 0.017 0.965   -0.674 0.091   0.959 0.022 
Main Activity:community or military 
serviceP*P … …   … …   … … 
Main Activity:houseworker -0.360 0.352   -0.698 0.078   -0.581 0.372 
Main Activity:other 0.411 0.665   0.133 0.897   -1.267 0.228 
Constant -4.664 0.000   -2.616 0.026   -8.079 0.000 
* variable excluded for scarcity of data 
 
 
Participation and perception of Europe’s social reality: the differences. 
The tendencial institutional slowness in adapting to change shown by some 
countries in a situation of incremental rise of the cost of the status-quo has been 
identified by many (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Bison & Esping-Andersen, 2000; Kohli, 
1999; Easterlin, 1987) as one of the key reasons for the decline of the traditional 
welfare state, especially in terms of susteinability. Moreover, many authors (see for 
example Wolfe, 1989; Fukuyama, 2000; Putnam, 2000; Beugelsdijk & Smulders, 
2003) TPF8FPT suggest the existence of a “crowding out effect” by which the focus of 
traditional welfare states on social expenditures and comprehensive social programs 
undermines informal caring relations, social networks, and systems of reciprocity and 
leads to a general decline of commitment to civil norms, of participation in civil 
society, and trust in fellow citizens and social institutions.  
A situation whereby individuals expect solutions from institutions that are not 
able to keep up with the development of society is a structural problem. As Delor 
foresaw, “the problem of how we finance the welfare state should not obscure a 
separate issue: if each person thinks he has an inalienable right to welfare, no matter 
what happens to the world, that's not equity, it's just creating a society where you can't 
ask anything of people”.  
Part of the Nordic success is due to the ability of these countries to invest in the 
creation of a renewed form of welfare state in closer dialogue with civil society 
(Esping-Andersen 1990, 2002, 2006). Such political architecture creates the structural 
and cultural conditions for a welfare mix operating in a social environment of high 
‘generalized trust’ between the populations and state-systems (Rothstein and Stolle 
2003) and where voluntary activity works complementary to the state, not a substitute 
for it (Bartkowski and Jasinka-Kania, 2004). 
Although the levels of participation are different, these considerations suggest 
the need of investigating whether such feeling of ‘generalized trust’ holds 
systematically in case of individual participation, whether different participatory 
styles suggest substantial differences in attitudes towards policy, society, and the 
economy, or whether other latent dimensions must be necessarily investigating before 
making any policy suggestion. 
                                                 
TP
8
PT The “crowding out” hypothesis must not be considered valid altogether. In fact some scholars reject 
the crowding out hypothesis by arguing that a well developed welfare state creates the structural and 
cultural conditions for a thriving and multiform civil society. The point could be certainly shared  
The first set of graphs investigates individual perceptions towards a number of 
social dimensions.  What is apparent is that people who participate perceive the world 
in a more positive way than those who don’t participate. In this sense, the first remark 
to be made is that the greater the participation, the higher the trust in others. “Trust 
lubricates cooperation. The greater the level of trust within a community, the greater 
the likelihood of cooperation. And cooperation itself breeds trust” (Putnam 1993:171). 
Considering people’s trust in the others (fig. 7), it is apparent that people in Nordic 
and Continental Europe engaged in participative activities has a more positive 
approach to the society.  On other hands, this trend is not completely confirmed in 
Southern and Eastern Europe.TPF9FPT By the way, Nordic fully engaged people report the 
highest mark with 6.57 while eastern European fully engaged report the lowest score: 
1.56. 
Figure 7 : Trust in others 
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The general picture shown in the previous graph is also confirmed when 
analyzing the “Trust in Politicians” (fig. 8). It is also interesting noticing that the 
average score assigned in the different clusters show the same trend, whereby the 
Nordic countries – on average – trust much more than Southern and Eastern countries. 
The anomaly of polish data is clear also in this question, with an peculiar behaviour of 
Privately engaged people. 
                                                 
TP
9
PT Again, the results of Eastern Europe are affected by the Polish data, which shows an anomalous 
concentration of answers.   
 Figure 8 : Trust in Politicians 
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The overall trend is still confirmed for the assessment of the satisfaction of the 
way democracy works in the country (fig.9) and the perception of the state of the 
economy (fig.10), where participants are more positive than non participants. The 
trend is uniform for Nordic and continental countries and more peculiar for the rest of 
Europe. Still present the polish anomaly. 
 
Figure 9 : Satisfaction of the way democracy works in the country 
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Figure 10 : assessment of the state of the Economy 
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One final remark regards the existance of some transversal dimensions suc as 
“voted in the last elections” (fig.11) or “importance of friend in life” (fig.12) that 
show common trends shared all across Europe. 
 
Figure 11 : Voted in the last elections 
 
 
 
Figure 12 : Importance of friends in life 
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Conclusions for future work 
The analyses presented do not advocate for the development of specific 
organization or structures. In fact, as suggested earlier, we are interested in the 
characteristics and development of the European social reality as a whole. 
Specifically, we are trying to understand what the determinants of social involvement 
are and whether involvement can enhance the results of the coordination process 
between State and stakeholders in an increasingly diverse society.  
Of course, we have sketched a picture that depends on the indicators chosen, 
which determine the representation of reality that we are using. A set of indicators is 
not reality itself, but rather a descriptive model of reality. This caveat explains the 
limited validity of the model for Eastern and Mediterranean countries and suggests 
that, in these countries, participation is driven by variables not considered in the 
model and not collected through the survey. Moreover the data used are from a 
survey undertaken in 2002, meaning that the picture today might be different.  
The possibility of drafting policy measures that can effectively support the close 
coordination between the stakeholders depend on the availability of adequate data and 
– in the present situation – we must highlight a problem with the quality of the 
available information as important variables, like informal participation, which is a 
typical asset of the Mediterranean region, are poorly or not at all represented.  
One point to highlight is the consistently positive effect of education for all kinds 
of participation in all the clusters. Such result advocates for looking at education as 
one of the possibly most transversal policy actions to undertake and suggests the 
importance of working on the quality of education systems both at basic and higher 
level. 
This empiric analysis characterizes some of the dimensions along which 
European social models differ while also suggesting that a situation whereby 
individuals expect solutions from institutions that are not able to keep up with the 
development of society is a structural problem. As Delor foresaw, “the problem of 
how we finance the welfare state should not obscure a separate issue: if each person 
thinks he has an inalienable right to welfare, no matter what happens to the world, 
that's not equity, it's just creating a society where you can't ask anything of people”. 
Part of the Nordic success is due to the ability of these countries to invest in the 
creation of a renewed form of welfare state in closer dialogue with civil society.  
The existence of such strong structural differences impedes the application of 
one-size-fits-all policies and suggest the need of cooking ah hoc recipes closely 
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agreed upon with the stakeholders, who take on the independent and legitimate role of 
interpreting social needs and of launching cooperation strategies at territorial level. In 
this paradigm, favoring individual participation to the public-value creation process is 
a key element and reminds us that “…how we associate with each other, and on what 
terms, has enormous implications for our well-being….” (Woolcock, 2001, p. 15). 
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